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W hen a supplier serves multiple buyers, the buyers often reserve the supplier’s capacity in advance to secure thesupply to fulfill their demand. In this study, we analyze two common types of capacity reservation: exclusive and
first-priority reservations. Both reservations give a buyer first access to its reserved capacity, but the reservations differ in
how the leftovers (if any) are used. In most cases, as long as the buyer gets to use the reserved capacity first, it does not
pay attention to how the leftover capacity is utilized, leaving that to the supplier’s discretion (first-priority). However, in a
number of cases, buyers prohibit discretionary use of the reserved capacity (“no one touches my leftovers”) and imple-
ment the restriction by placing an employee at the supplier or installing monitoring devices (exclusive). One potential ben-
efit of first-priority capacity is resource pooling: allowing access to one another’s leftovers can reduce the amount of
capacity reserved by the buyers while enabling the supplier to satisfy buyers’ orders better in some cases. The Operations
Management literature suggests that the benefit of resource pooling is greater when the demand correlation is negative
and smaller when the correlation is positive. We investigate the capacity reservation type and level that each buyer
chooses facing uncertain (and correlated) demand. We investigate how the reservation price and demand correlation affect
the equilibrium outcome. We also examine the supplier’s decision to set the optimal reservation prices. We find that at
least one firm reserves first-priority capacity in equilibrium as long as the supplier offers a discount for first-priority
capacity (or charges a premium for exclusive capacity). Depending on the reservation price difference and demand corre-
lation, we find that the equilibrium outcome is inefficient (i.e., not Pareto optimal) for the buyers when they settle in a
free-rider or a prisoner’s dilemma equilibrium. We show that the supplier always induces both buyers to reserve a large
amount of exclusive capacity so that the supplier can make profits from both capacity reservation and production. While
this seems like the best scenario for the supplier, we show that, allowing bilateral capacity transfer (e.g., the buyers trad-
ing their reserved capacity) can improve not only the buyers’ profits but also the supplier’s profit.
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1. Introduction
When multiple firms procure from the same supplier,
a significant risk is capacity shortage. To secure
enough supply, many buying firms reserve capacity
before demands are realized by paying a fee. Once the
demand is realized, buying firms have the first right
to use the reserved capacity. In many cases, buying
firms do not manage or control their unused reserved
capacity, leaving the usage of the leftovers to the sup-
plier’s discretion (first-priority capacity). According to
the Global Supply Chain Director at a leading agricul-
tural supply firm, the company routinely pays to
reserve capacity of its key ingredient suppliers. As
long as the suppliers fulfill the orders, the firm does
not restrict how the unused capacity is used by its
suppliers. Roels and Tang (2017) consider a similar
situation where the reserved capacity if not utilized
can be used to serve the demand of another firm.
In some cases, however, the reserved capacity is
exclusively tied to the buying firm, excluding any dis-
cretionary use by the supplier (exclusive capacity).
One major buyer of Cosmax1 exclusively reserved ca-
pacity of filling machines at the supplier. The exclu-
sivity was enforced using proprietary molds and
monitoring devices (counters). Thus, the buyer is able
to monitor the machine’s utilization. The exclusivity
can also be implemented, for example, by a buying
firm’s employee residing in the supplier’s factory
(e.g., Cisco).
While both first-priority and exclusive capacity
reservations guarantee the first right to access the
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reserved capacity to the buying firms, the feasibility
of using the leftovers affects the total available capac-
ity of the supplier as well as that of the buying firms.
One apparent benefit of first-priority capacity is
that it allows the supplier to pool the uncertain
demands of the buying firms and increase total capac-
ity usage. For the same total capacity, first-priority
reservation allows the supplier to produce more than
exclusive reservation through demand pooling. The
Operations Management (OM) literature has shown
that the benefit of pooling is larger when demands are
uncorrelated or negatively correlated than when they
are positively correlated (Simchi-Levi et al. 2008), and
variability pooling has become one of the most popu-
lar OM practices. However, in a supply chain where
each buying firm pays to reserve capacity, pooling
production resources may not always benefit the sup-
plier. To see this, consider the case where both buying
firms know they can access the other’s leftover capac-
ity. Knowing that they can potentially access the other
firm’s capacity when their demand is high, the firms
may decide to reserve less, which then reduces the
total capacity and the supplier’s profit. If this hap-
pens, the supplier no longer benefits much from the
pooled resources. On the other hand, although the
supplier cannot pool the resources under exclusive
capacity, exclusivity can induce both buyers to
reserve more capacity, potentially resulting in a
higher profit for the supplier. Therefore, the benefit of
pooling through first-priority reservation is no longer
trivial when multiple firms reserve capacity, and its
advantage over exclusive reservation depends not
only on the difference in the capacity reservation
prices (e.g., the premium to reserve capacity exclu-
sively) but also on demand correlation, as both factors
together affect the reservation type and level that each
buyer chooses.
In this study, we investigate capacity reservation in
a supply chain with multiple buyers. Specifically, our
research questions are as follows: (i) Which types of
capacity will buying firms reserve and what are the
corresponding capacity levels? (ii) How does the
demand correlation drive the firms’ capacity reserva-
tion decisions? (iii) Under which type of capacity
reservation does the supplier benefit more? (iv) If
inefficiency arises due to under-reservation or over-
reservation, how should the capacity reservation
practice be adjusted to improve efficiency?
We examine these questions in a non-cooperative
game with one supplier supplying to two buying
firms. In this game, each firm, facing uncertain
demand, decides the capacity reservation type—be-
tween exclusive and first-priority reservations—and the
capacity reservation level. Then, demands are real-
ized and fulfilled according to the contractual term of
the reserved capacity. We characterize conditions (as
a function of the reservation price and demand corre-
lation) under which each of three equilibria emerges:
both firms reserving a large amount of exclusive
capacity, both firms reserving first-priority capacity,
and one firm reserving exclusive capacity and the
other reserving first-priority capacity. In the latter two
equilibria (with both firms or only one firm reserving
first-priority capacity), we show that the reservation
level explicitly depends on the reservation prices and
demand correlation. As the price of reserving exclu-
sive capacity increases, the equilibrium changes from
both reserving exclusive capacity, to only one firm
reserving exclusive capacity, to neither firm reserving
exclusive capacity. Interestingly, we find that, if a
small premium for exclusive capacity is imposed, one
firm chooses the more expensive exclusive capacity
while the other firm chooses the first-priority capac-
ity. Reserving the more expensive exclusive capacity
forces the other firm to build a larger capacity, and
pays off when the firm’s demand is high as the firm
can tap into the other firm’s leftover capacity. We also
investigate how the equilibrium regime changes as
demand correlation changes.
We find that the buying firms can be hurt in equilib-
rium in two ways. In the first case, both firms are
trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma, where they reserve a
large amount of exclusive capacity even when the
reservation prices are the same for both types. In the
second case, a free-rider equilibrium, where one firm
allows the other to free-ride on its capacity, can arise.
In both cases, the total profit of both firms could have
increased had they both chosen first-priority capacity
and benefited from the pooled capacity. As demand
correlation becomes sufficiently high, both adverse
outcomes vanish because buyers benefit less from
capacity pooling.
We then extend the model to include the situation
where the supplier decides the capacity reservation
prices. Interestingly, we find that, in equilibrium, the
supplier will always choose reservation prices such
that both firms will be induced to reserve a large
amount of exclusive capacity. This means that, offer-
ing a discount in exchange for the freedom to use the
leftover capacity (or charging a premium for exclu-
sive reservation) does not benefit the supplier. While
inducing buying firms to reserve a large exclusive
capacity seems best for the supplier, we show that the
supplier can charge an even higher reservation price
if the buyers are able to transfer their reserved capac-
ity with a fee. We show that, under certain conditions,
allowing capacity transfer with a fee between the
buying firms is Pareto-improving and increases the
profit of all parties. We show that such a win–win–
win outcome can occur when demand correlation is
low. Finally, we numerically show that our main
results and insights hold for other demand models.
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The rest of the study is organized as follows. We
review the relevant literature in section 2. Then we
analyze the base model in section 3 and derive the
supplier’s equilibrium capacity reservation prices in
section 4. We then consider the transferrable capacity
reservation in section 5. We conduct a final check of
the robustness of the analytical findings by numerical
study in section 6 before concluding in section 7.
2. Literature Review
Our work is one of the first papers to combine sour-
cing from a shared supplier and capacity reservation.
Nevertheless, our contributions are best understood
in light of the findings of the papers on a supply net-
work with shared suppliers and capacity manage-
ment. We review the related literature from both
strands of work below.
Our work is closely related to the outsourcing litera-
ture. Earlier work focuses on analyzing the relationship
between one buyer and one supplier, as, for example,
in Iyer et al. (2005), Zhu et al. (2007) and Babich (2010).
In more recent years, the focus has moved toward
more complicated relationships, to include dual sour-
cing (Li 2013, Li and Wan 2016, Wang et al. 2010) and
a back-up supplier (Yang et al. 2009). Papers in the set-
ting where firms outsource to a common supplier
cover issues including economy of scale (Cachon and
Harker 2002), strategic use of sourcing from a high cost
supplier (Arya et al. 2008), supplier’s reliability
(Wadecki et al. 2012), knowledge spillover (Wang et al.
2014), and vertical integration and supplier develop-
ment (Jin et al. 2019). All of these papers explore differ-
ent incentives to outsource, identify possible adverse
outcomes as a result of outsourcing, and find ways to
coordinate misaligned incentives using either a non-
cooperative or cooperative game framework. Most
papers that examine multiple firms outsourcing to a
common supplier do not consider a capacity con-
straint. Discussions related to capacity management in
an outsourcing setting are relatively sparse.
Capacity management (within a firm) has been
studied in the industrial organization and operations
management literature for decades, with Dixit (1980)
being an example of an early and influential paper in
this area. Van Mieghem (2003) and Wu et al. (2005)
provide reviews of earlier work. More recent papers
in capacity investment within the firm or in an out-
sourcing setting cover issues on competing firms’
choice of flexible or dedicated technology (Goyal and
Netessine 2007), the impact of contract manufacturing
on innovation and capacity investment (Plambeck
and Taylor 2005, 2007), timing of market entry (€Ulk€u
et al. 2005), demand forecast accuracy and invest-
ment responsibility (€Ulk€u et al. 2007), and competing
firms’ investment in a shared supplier (Qi et al. 2015).
Qi et al. (2015) consider a similar supply chain struc-
ture with two buying firms sharing a common sup-
plier; their work focuses on the competition between
the firms facing non-linear capacity investment costs
and deterministic demand. The focus of the study is
to examine how much capacity each firm will build
for given its capacity type and the competitor’s type.
On the other hand, our study examines both the
capacity reservation type and level that both firms
choose given stochastic demand and demand correla-
tion. These two papers complement each other and
further our understanding of shared capacity.
A few recent papers address capacity reservation
issues in an outsourcing setting with multiple buying
firms. Roels and Tang (2017) consider a bidirectional
alliance between two firms with exogenously endowed
capacity. The firms make their capacity reservation
and/or capacity transfer pricing decisions under ex-
ogenously given contract types. Each firm’s production
requires one unit of capacity by each firm, and there-
fore the (endowed) capacities are strategic comple-
ments for production. The focus of the firm is a
bilateral capacity exchange between the two buying
firms. In contrast, we consider a supply network with
two buying firms sharing a common supplier where the
supplier’s capacity is installed upon the capacity reser-
vation decisions by the buying firms. In our setting,
each firm chooses their contract types to reserve
capacity. Each firm’s production requires one unit of
the supplier’s capacity (whether it is reserved by the
firm itself or by the other firm if the contract allows
such access), and therefore the (reserved) capacities
by the two firms are strategic substitutes in nature.
These differences make the results and insights differ-
ent in their work and ours.
Kemahlıoglu-Ziya (2015) consider the contract of
two firms with a manufacturer for capacity reserva-
tion and wholesale prices. They can renegotiate the
contracts after demand realization, allowing the firms
to use more or less capacity than what was con-
tracted. They show that a firm with a weaker buyer
power (who was not able to negotiate a low wholesale
price upfront) may benefit more from renegotiation
than a stronger firm. Li et al. (2011) compare three
capacity reservation options: no-transfer, supplier-
transfer, and buyer-transfer, depending on whether
the reserved capacity can be accessed by other firms
and whether it is costly to access the other firm’s
reserved capacity. They identify which option is opti-
mal from the supplier’s perspective. In contrast with
these two papers, our work differs (among other
minor points) in that neither of the papers consider
the situation where buying firms can endogenously
restrict how the reserved capacity should be used by
the supplier. This feature together with demand cor-
relation allows us to derive managerial insights
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regarding the practices in using the different reserva-
tion contracts.
3. Base Model
We consider a model with a single supplier and two
buying firms who sell products at price p. We use
i = 1, 2 to index the two (buying) firms, and s to
denote the supplier. At the beginning of the game,
each firm selects a type of capacity reservation. Then,
each firm selects the capacity reservation level and
pays the reservation fee before demand realization.
After each firm reserves capacity, the demands are
realized, and each firm places an order (at the unit
wholesale price w) to fulfill its demand using the
supplier’s capacity.
We consider two reservation types. Under the exclu-
sive (denoted by e) reservation, the buying firm exclu-
sively uses the reserved capacity and prohibits the
usage of any leftover capacity for the other firm. Under
the first-priority reservation (denoted by f), the buying
firm has the first priority to use the capacity, but leaves
the usage of leftover capacity to the supplier’s discre-
tion. The combination of reserved capacity type and
level together with the realized demands determines
the amount of capacity that firms can tap into. For
instance, if both firms choose exclusive reservation,
each firm can produce only up to its own reserved
capacity. On the other hand, if both firms choose first-
priority reservation, each firm can use its own reserved
capacity plus the leftover capacity of the other firm.
Let ce and cf be the unit price to reserve exclusive and
first-priority capacity, respectively. Hence, if firm i
chooses to reserve ki units of capacity with type
si 2 {e, f}, the total cost is csi ki. We assume that exclu-
sive reservation is more costly than first-priority reser-
vation (ce ≥ cf). This assumption is reasonable, since the
supplier can use the leftovers of first-priority capacity to
fulfill other orders, but must waste any leftover capacity
under exclusive capacity.2 We note, however, that our
analysis and derivation do not require that ce ≥ cf.
To model a firm’s profit function, let Di be the ran-
dom variable representing the uncertain demand of
firm i. Then, for given capacity reservation levels
(k1, k2), firm i’s expected profit function under capac-
ity type (s1, s2) is as follows,
ps1s2i ðk1; k2Þ ¼ ðp wÞE½minfDi; ki þ ðkj DjÞþ1fsj¼fgg
 csi ki; for i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6¼ j:
ð1Þ
Note that 1fCg ¼ 1 if condition C is satisfied, and 0
otherwise, and X+ ≜ max {X, 0}.
From this, the equilibrium capacity reservation













From Equation (2), we can recast the problem to
choose the capacity reservation types as a 2 9 2
reduced form game with the following payoff matrix
in which Ps1s2i represents the sub-game perfect
expected profit, that is,Ps1s2i , p
s1s2
i ðks1s21 ; ks1s22 Þ.
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One of the central research questions is how
demand correlation affects the type and level of
capacity reservation. As the literature on pooling sug-
gests, the utilization of pooled resources is greater
when demands are negatively correlated because the
fact that one firm’s demand is high (hence, more
capacity is needed) implies that the other firm’s
demand is low (hence, it is more likely to have left-
over capacity). Therefore, even when the marginal
demand distribution remains unchanged, the capac-
ity type and level that a buyer prefers may change
depending on the demand correlation. To derive the
results and insights analytically (sections 3–5), we
consider the following demand distribution for Di.
Following the literature, e.g., Roels and Tang (2017),
we assume all the cost and price parameters as well
as the demand distributions are public information.
We consider that Di is identically distributed and
follows a marginal distribution with the realized
value of H of probability a and L of probability
1  a, and we use b to denote the conditional proba-
bility of firm i’s demand being H given that firm j’s
demand is also H. Note that by changing b while fix-
ing a, we are able to change the demand correlation
without changing the marginal distribution of Di.
We establish the relationship between the demand
correlation q and the condition probability b in the
following lemma. All proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
LEMMA 1. (JOINT DEMAND DISTRIBUTION AND DEMAND
CORRELATION). Let Pr(Di = H) = a and Pr(Di = H|
Dj = H) = b, i, j 2 {1, 2}, i 6¼ j.
(i) The joint distribution of demands, (Di, Dj), is as
follows.
PrðDi ¼ H;Dj ¼ HÞ ¼ ba;
PrðDi ¼ H;Dj ¼ LÞ ¼ PrðDi ¼ L;Dj ¼ HÞ
¼ ð1 bÞa;
PrðDi ¼ L;Dj ¼ LÞ ¼ 1 2aþ ab:
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(ii) The demand correlation q is a linear function of the
conditional probability b:
q ¼ b a
1 a : ð3Þ
(iii) As b increases, ceteris paribus, the demand
correlation increases while the marginal distribution
remains unchanged. Consider the range of b under
which the joint distribution is well-defined. The
corresponding range for the demand correlation q is
½ a1a ; 1 when a 2 ½0; 12Þ; and ½a1a ; 1 when
a 2 ½12 ; 1.
Note that the demand model above allows us to iso-
late the effect of demand correlation without losing
analytical tractability. The feasible region of the
demand correlation with respect to the marginal dis-
tribution a is shown in Figure 1. Note that the per-
fectly negative correlation of 1 can occur only when
the marginal distribution is symmetric, that is, a ¼ 12.
When the marginal distribution is not symmetric,
negative correlation is possible, but the lowest corre-
lation for a given marginal distribution is greater than
1. Note that our marginal demand distribution
(two-point demand distribution) is known as the
“boom-bust” distribution and has been used exten-
sively to model demand in the OM and marketing
literature (e.g., Taylor and Plambeck 2007). Alterna-
tively, one might consider using a bivariate normal
distribution with correlation. We show that while
most results continued to hold under the bivariate
normal distributions (as shown in section 6), deriving
clean analytic results is still challenging with such a
distribution.
The linear relationship between the demand corre-
lation q and the conditional probability b in Equa-
tion (3) allows us to easily capture the impact of
demand correlation by analyzing the impact of the
conditional probability b. For convenience of exposi-
tion, we refer to b as “proxy demand correlation” in
the following analysis.
Note that we do not explicitly model whether the
two firms are competing or not. Instead, we capture
the impact of the relationship between the firms on
their capacity reservation at the supplier through
demand correlation. For instance, if the two firms face
independent demands, then the correlation is zero. If
the two firms compete in a zero-sum game, the corre-
lation is 1.
In what follows, we first analyze the equilibrium
capacity reservation levels for given capacity reserva-
tion type choices by both firms in section 3.1, and
then characterize the equilibrium capacity type
choices in section 3.2.
3.1. Capacity Reservation Levels
Before we present our results, it should be noted that
we (implicitly) assume that the marginal cost to
reserve one unit of capacity is less than the expected
marginal profit to satisfy one unit of demand, that is,
csi  ðp  wÞa. Otherwise, it is trivial to show that the
firms will only reserve a capacity level equal to or less
than the lower bound L (note that the firm will not
reserve any capacity if the capacity reservation cost is
higher than the profit margin, that is, csi [ p  w).
Similar assumptions can be found in the literature; see,
for example, Taylor and Plambeck (2007). When there
are multiple equilibria in capacity reservation levels,
which occur when both firms choose first-priority
capacity and the capacity reservation price is high, or
when the capacity reservation price exactly equals the
threshold value of each region (defined in the proposi-
tion below). In the former case, the symmetric equilib-
rium is selected that results in a fair split of profits
between the buying firms. In the latter case, all equilib-
ria are payoff-invariant and we therefore assume that
the one in the proposition below is selected without
loss of generality. The following result shows the equi-
librium capacity reservation levels for given capacity
reservation types by both firms.
PROPOSITION 1. (EQUILIBRIUM CAPACITY RESERVATION
LEVEL). Consider csi  ðp  wÞa. There are three scenar-
ios contingent on the capacity reservation types (s1, s2):
(i) Both firms reserve exclusive capacity, that is,
(s1, s2) = (e, e). The equilibrium capacity
reservation level is keei ¼ H.






Figure 1 Feasible Region of Demand Correlation q with Respect to
the Marginal Distribution a When the Marginal Demand
Distributions of the Two Buyers are Identical [Color figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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(ii) One firm, say firm 1, reserves exclusive capacity
while the other firm reserves first-priority capacity,
that is, (s1, s2) = (e, f). The other case is
symmetric. The equilibrium capacity reservation
level k
ef
i is as follows:
Firm 1 with type e : k
ef
1 ¼
H if ce ðp wÞab,
L if ce [ ðp wÞab;

Firm 2 with type f : k
ef
2 ¼ H:
(iii) Both firms reserve first-priority capacity, that is,
(s1, s2) = (f, f). The equilibrium capacity
reservation level k
ff




H if cf ðp wÞab;
HþL
2 if cf [ ðp wÞab.

We make the following observations from the
proposition. When both firms choose exclusive
reservations, the only capacity level that is sup-
ported in equilibrium is (H, H). This occurs because
a firm cannot access the other’s leftover capacity
and the marginal cost of capacity reservation is less
than the expected profit from any additional unit of
capacity beyond L: ce ≤ (p  w)a. For all other equi-
libria, the capacity reservation level depends on the
price of the capacity reservation (ce and cf) and
demand correlation (b). Under both the (e, f) and (f,
f) regimes, the equilibrium capacity level is (weakly)
increasing in demand correlation. This occurs
because, as the correlation increases, it becomes less
likely that the firm is able to access the other firm’s
capacity when needed, and each firm thus needs to
raise the capacity reservation level to cover its own
demand.
Another interesting finding to note is that an equi-
librium exists under which firm 1 induces firm 2 to
reserve more first-priority capacity (H units) when
firm 1 itself reserves less exclusive capacity (L units).
This equilibrium is likely to occur when exclusive
capacity is expensive (thus, it is too costly to reserve
H) and the demand correlation (b) is low.
Finally, we observe that, under the (f, f) equilib-
rium, both firms reserve H when correlation is high
and Hþ L2 when correlation is low. To see this, consider
the case where correlation is close to 1. Then the
chance of using the other’s capacity is low, with the
result that each firm builds sufficient capacity to cover
its own demand. The opposite happens when the cor-
relation is low or negative. When the firm sees high
demand, the chance that the other firm has leftover
capacity is high, thus reducing the capacity reserva-
tion level needed to fulfill the demand.
3.2. Capacity Reservation Type Choices
We next characterize in the following proposition how
firms choose the capacity type in equilibrium given
the capacity reservation prices (ce, cf). For ease of expo-
sition, we show the result by varying ce for a given cf.
PROPOSITION 2. (EQUILIBRIUM CAPACITY TYPE
CHOICES). Given cf and b, the following result charac-
terizes the equilibrium capacity type.
(i) If ce = cf ≤ (p  w)ab, both firms are indifferent
between choosing e and f. If ce = cf > (p  w)ab,
choosing e is a weakly dominant strategy for both
firms.
(ii) If ce ≥ cf, there exists a threshold ceðcf ; bÞ such that
the equilibrium capacity type is (e, f) (or (f, e)) for
ce  ceðcf ; bÞ and (f, f) for ce  ceðcf ; bÞ.
If ce = cf ≤ (p  w)ab, the reservation price is low
and both firms reserve H units of capacity regardless
of the type. Therefore, both firms can always satisfy
demand with their own capacity and are indifferent
between the two capacity types. We next explain why
choosing e is the weakly dominant strategy when
ce = cf > (p  w)ab. When firm j chooses exclusive
capacity, firm i is indifferent between choosing exclu-
sive or first-priority capacity, because both types of
capacity cost are the same (since ce = cf). When firm j
chooses first-priority capacity, firm i is better off
reserving capacity exclusively, as doing so forces firm
j to reserve more. As a result, it is a dominant strategy
for both firms to reserve capacity exclusively. We later
show, however, that the weak dominance of exclusive
capacity (hence, the (e, e) equilibrium) can make both
firms worse off in Proposition 3.
Now consider the case of ce ≥ cf, which occurs when
the supplier gives a discount if the buying firm allows
the supplier to use leftover capacity, or charges a pre-
mium if the buying firm demands exclusivity. In this
case, the difference in reservation prices is critical.
When ce is slightly greater than cf, that is,
cf  ce  ceðcf ; bÞ, interestingly, one firm is willing to
choose the more expensive exclusive capacity in equi-
librium, that is, (e, f) emerges as an equilibrium. To
see why, if firm j chooses first-priority capacity, firm i
should choose exclusive capacity, because doing so
forces firm j to build a larger capacity that firm i can
tap into (as in discussions following Proposition 1). In
particular, when demand correlation is low or nega-
tive, the good chance of tapping into the other firm’s
capacity reduces firm i’s capacity reservation level. If
firm j chooses exclusive capacity, firm i should choose
first-priority capacity because it is cheaper and firm i
cannot access firm j’s leftovers in any case. Therefore,
in this situation, the firms settle in an equilibrium
where one firm free-rides on the other firm’s unused
capacity. However, when ce is sufficiently high,
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ce  ceðcf ; bÞ, first-priority capacity is considerably
cheaper and both firms choose f.
We then investigate an important question: when is
the resulting equilibrium efficient for both firms? The
following results show that the equilibrium outcome
can be inefficient for the buying firms in two ways.
PROPOSITION 3. (ADVERSE EQUILIBRIA FOR THE BUYING
FIRMS). Given cf and b,
(i) When ce = cf > (p  w)ab, a prisoner’s dilemma
equilibrium occurs, where both firms could have
increased their profits if both of them had chosen
first-priority capacity instead of exclusive capacity.
(ii) When cf  ce  ceðcf ; bÞ, a free-rider equilibrium
occurs, where the one firm chooses first-priority
capacity while the other firm chooses exclusive
capacity.
When ce is considerably larger than cf
(ce [ ceðcf ; bÞ), the capacity reservation price becomes
the dominant driver, and both firms choosing the less
expensive option (first-priority) is efficient.
When ce falls between cf and ceðcf ; bÞ, the equilib-
rium outcomes become inefficient. For instance, if
ce = cf > (p  w)ab (when there is no price gap
between exclusive and first-priority reservations),
both firms’ choosing exclusive capacity is an equilib-
rium, but both firms could have improved their prof-
its had they chosen first-priority capacity together.
The reason for this result is that both firms are able to
access the other’s leftover capacity and leverage
capacity pooling under first-priority capacity. There-





i (see Proposition 1), and earn a higher profit
with first-priority capacity.
When first-priority capacity becomes slightly
cheaper, that is, cf  ce  ceðcf ; bÞ, a free-rider equilib-
rium arises because one firm chooses exclusive capac-
ity while the other firm is willing to choose first-
priority capacity (part (ii) of Proposition 2). In this
case, the firm reserving exclusive capacity would
have been better off if it had reserved the same-
amount as first-priority (since cf < ce). However,
doing so could not induce the other firm to reserve H
units of first-priority capacity. Hence, the firm had to
burn money to induce the other firm to reserve more.
Figure 2 illustrates Propositions 2 and 3.
While Propositions 2 and 3 describe how the equi-
librium outcomes are affected by capacity reservation
prices and their difference, the following results
describe how demand correlation changes the equilib-
rium outcome.
PROPOSITION 4. (IMPACT OF DEMAND CORRELATION). The
threshold ceðcf ; bÞ decreases in b. Hence, the free-rider
region shrinks as demand correlation (q) increases.
We illustrate the proposition in Figure 3. Note that
the free-rider region, (e, f), occurs when firm i chooses
the more expensive exclusive capacity to induce firm j
(who chooses the cheaper first-priority capacity) to
reserve more capacity. When the demand correlation
increases, firm i’s chance to access firm j’s leftovers
decreases. Hence, the savings from free-riding
decrease. When the correlation becomes sufficiently
large, firm i will be better off reserving the less expen-
sive first-priority capacity, and thus the equilibrium
outcome switches from (e, f) to (f, f).
To study the impact of correlation in isolation, let
us consider the case where reservation costs are the
same for both types that is, ce = cf. We note that the
firm supplies products such as fertilizers and pesti-
cide in the agricultural supply industry where
demands are highly correlated and impacted by sea-
sonality. Therefore, the buying firm’s demand has a
very high correlation with other firms in the same
industry. Figure 3 illustrates that, when the demand
correlation is quite high, the chance for one firm to
use the other’s leftover is quite small. In this case, nei-
ther the supplier (since it is able to set the same price
for both types of capacity) nor the buyers (due to the
high demand correlation) care about the capacity
type. In other words, whether the firm chooses exclu-
sive or first-priority capacity has the same impact
(thus the first-priority capacity is de facto exclusive).
On the other hand, when demand correlation is not
high as in the cosmetics example, then the exclusive
capacity can be chosen.
Figure 2 Equilibrium Capacity Type Choices (given first-priority capac-
ity cost cf and demand correlation q)
Note. The prisoner’s dilemma occurs when ce = cf > (p  w)ab.
Figure 3 Impact of Demand Correlation on Equilibrium Capacity Types
(given first-priority capacity cost cf)
Note. For example, as the demand correlation increases from the low q
to the high q value, the free-rider region (indicated by the dashed and
dotted lines, respectively) shrinks.
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4. Supplier’s Capacity Reservation
Prices
In section 3, we analyzed how buying firms should
reserve capacity for given reservation prices ce and
cf. In this section, we consider the supplier’s prob-
lem to strategically choose the reservation price of
each capacity type. With the endogenous pricing
decision of the strategic supplier, we now have a
two-stage game where the supplier chooses capac-
ity prices ce and cf in the first stage, and the two
buying firms will play the second-stage game that
has been modeled and analyzed in section 3. We
focus on a setting where the supplier only installs
the capacity reserved by the two buyers. We dis-
cuss the implications of this assumption in sec-
tion 4.1.
Specifically, consider the profit for the supplier
who chooses capacity prices ce and cf. Then, firms 1
and 2 will choose capacity types s1 and s2 and capac-
ity level ks1s21 and k
s1s2
2 according to the subgame per-
fect equilibrium in Propositions 1 and 2. Then, the
expected profit of the supplier is:



















where c represents the additional capacity installa-
tion cost (or investment) that the supplier needs to
incur to secure reserved capacity.
We obtain the supplier’s equilibrium capacity reser-
vations prices in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5. (EQUILIBRIUM CAPACITY RESERVATION
PRICES). In equilibrium, the supplier chooses
ce ¼ ðp  wÞa and cf ¼ ce . Consequently, both firms
are trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma when both firms
choose exclusive capacity in equilibrium.
We note that the supplier’s profit has two parts: the
production profit (from the wholesale prices of ful-
filled orders) and the reservation profit (from the
capacity reservation fee). The production profit is
determined by overall capacity and the flexibility in
utilizing the leftover capacity (which will determine
how the capacity is used), while the capacity reserva-
tion profit is determined by the capacity types (and
therefore the corresponding reservation prices) and
levels. We next discuss the trade-off the supplier faces
when deciding capacity prices.
If the supplier decides to induce both firms to
choose first-priority capacity, it must offer a
discount so that first-priority capacity is appealing
to the buyers. However, since each firm can access
the other’s leftovers, buyers can leverage demand
pooling, which can lead to a decrease in total
capacity. As a result, the supplier earns less capac-
ity reservation profit. In this case, the supplier is
flexible in utilizing the leftover capacity to satisfy
both firms’ orders, and the benefit from this
arrangement is evident when one firm sees demand
H while the other sees L. However, despite the flex-
ibility in utilizing the reserved capacity to serve the
demand, the supplier does not necessarily earn a
higher production profit because the total reserved
capacity may be smaller.
On the other hand, if the supplier decides to induce
both firms to choose exclusive capacity, the supplier
sets the capacity reservation prices to be the same
under both exclusive and first-priority capacity, and
the buying firms reserve a larger capacity since they
cannot access each other’s leftovers. Thus, the sup-
plier earns a larger capacity reservation profit under
exclusive capacity and the production profit can also
be higher if the total reservation level is sufficiently
large. This situation can be achieved by setting
ce ¼ cf ¼ ðp  wÞa. The supplier’s profit under the
scenario where one firm chooses exclusive capacity
and the other chooses first-priority capacity is
between the two extreme cases.
We observe that by setting the capacity reservation
prices of ce ¼ cf ¼ ðp  wÞa, the supplier is able to
induce both firms to reserve exclusive capacity: in
fact, one can see that ce = (p  w)a is the highest price
that can still induce buyers to reserve H units of exclu-
sive capacity. Thus, the supplier is able to extract
more reservation profit (from the larger reserved
capacity) without compromising any production
profit. As such, it is optimal for the supplier to set the
capacity reservation prices this way. As a side note,
although there exist two possible equilibria when
ce ¼ cf , in order to ensure both firms to choose exclu-
sive capacity, the supplier may add an arbitrarily
small premium of e > 0 to the capacity reservation
price of first-priority capacity and make first-priority
capacity slightly more expensive than exclusive
capacity.
REMARK. We consider that the strategic supplier
determines capacity reservation prices ce and cf
instead of wholesale prices for two reasons. First,
we would like to isolate the impact of capacity
reservation prices from other strategic considera-
tions. If the wholesale price is endogenized, for
example, there can be scenarios in which a higher
capacity reservation price is compensated for by a
lower wholesale price, diluting the focus of the ana-
lysis. Second, this setting also follows the
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convention of the capacity reservation literature, cf.,
Li et al. (2011), whereby the wholesale price w is
exogenously given while the capacity reservation
prices are endogenized.
4.1. Supplier’s Capacity Installation Decisions
In the base model, we implicitly assume that the
supplier only installs the capacity reserved by the
buyers. In this section, we explore the possibility
that the supplier may install an additional ks units of
capacity besides those k1 + k2 reserved by the buying
firms. To access the additional ks units of capacity,
the firms do not need to pay the capacity reservation
price. To allocate the ks units of capacity between the
two buying firms without inducing order quantity
manipulation, we adopt the uniform allocation rule
(Cachon and Lariviere 1999). As a result, firm i is
able to access ks/2 units of the “free” capacity plus
any leftover from firm j’s allocated free capacity. We
assume the buying firms first use their reserved
(either exclusive or first-priority) capacity before
using the unattached free capacity to satisfy their
demand.
To analyze the supplier’s additional capacity instal-
lation decision, we define the residual demand
Ds1s2r ðk1; k2Þ, which is the total demand not satisfied
by the reserved capacities k1 and k2, as follows.
Ds1s2r ðk1; k2Þ ¼
X2
i;j¼1;i6¼j
Di  ki  ðkj DjÞþ1fsj¼fg
h iþ
ð5Þ
It is immediate that the residual demand decreases
in the reserved capacities k1 and k2 in the usual
stochastic order sense3 as characterized in the follow-
ing lemma.
LEMMA 2. For any k1, k2, k̂1, and k̂2 such that
0  k1  k̂1 and 0  k2  k̂2, the residual demand
Ds1s2r ðk1; k2Þ  st Ds1s2r ðk̂1; k̂2Þ.
Intuitively, the more capacity reserved by the buy-
ing firms, the less residual demand there might be. To
satisfy the residual demand, the supplier may install
additional ks units of capacity. The supplier’s decision
problem is as follows:
max
ks
wE min Ds1s2r ðk1; k2Þ; ks
 
  cks; ð6Þ
Solving the supplier’s decision problem, we obtain
the following results. Let ks ðk1; k2; s1; s2Þ denote the
supplier’s optimal free capacity decision.
PROPOSITION 6. Given the capacity reservation types
(s1, s2), the supplier’s optimal free capacity
ks ðk1; k2; s1; s2Þ decreases in k1 and k2. In addition, if
w < c, the supplier’s optimal free capacity is as follows:
ks ðk1; k2; s1; s2Þ ¼ 0:
The first observation from the proposition is that
the optimal free capacity decreases in the reserved
capacities by the buying firms. Intuitively, the
reserved capacity and the free capacity are substitutes
to satisfy the demand. Thus, the more capacity both
firms reserve, the less free capacity the supplier
should install. The second observation is that the opti-
mal free capacity depends on the relationship
between the wholesale price w (as well as the proba-
bility distribution of the residual demand) and the
capacity installation cost c. When the wholesale price
is lower than the capacity installation cost, the sup-
plier has no incentive to install additional capacity.
This case echoes the base model setting. In such a sce-
nario, unless the buying firm pays a fee to reserve the
capacity, the supplier will not build any free capacity.
Thus, the total installed capacity equals to the
reserved capacity by the buying firms.
We next make the following observation on the con-
sequence if the condition w < c is grossly violated.
Recall that neither buying firm has incentives to reserve
a capacity higher thanH; that is, ki ≤ H, i = 1, 2.
OBSERVATION 1. If wab > c, the supplier’s optimal free
capacity is:
ks ðk1; k2; s1; s2Þ ¼ 2H  k1  k2:
When the wholesale price is sufficiently high, the
supplier will install a sufficient amount of free capac-
ity to cover all the residual demand. In this case, given
the free capacity level ks ðk1; k2; s1; s2Þ, firm 1’s
expected profit function under capacity type (s1, s2) is
as follows; firm 2’s profit function can be obtained























In either case, the minimum capacity for firm 1 is
obtained when D2 = H as follows:
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k1 þ 2H  k1  k2
2




¼ H  k2  k1
2




Thus, firm 1’s demand is always satisfied regard-
less of the capacity reservation level k1, and it is
optimal for firm 1 to reserve k1 = 0. Intuitively,
anticipating that the supplier will install sufficient
capacity to cover the residual demand, neither buy-
ing firm has incentives to pay a fee to reserve the
capacity in the earlier stage. Thus, the capacity
reservation by the buying firms is not a key con-
cern in such a setting.
To summarize, one sufficient condition to guaran-
tee that the supplier commits not to install additional
free capacity besides those reserved by the buying
firms is w < c. If the condition is grossly violated, for
example, when the wholesale price is sufficiently high
(see Observation 1 above), the supplier may have
incentives to install ample capacity to satisfy the
demand. In such a scenario, the capacity reservation
by the buying firm is not a key issue.
5. Capacity Reservation with Transfer
Price
In the previous section, we have shown that when the
supplier strategically determines reservation prices,
the supplier does so in a way that both firms reserve a
large quantity of exclusive capacity. If the supplier
further increases reservation prices, buyers will
reserve less capacity and will reduce the supplier’s
profit. In fact, we show that the supplier charges the
highest price that induces reserving H units of exclu-
sive capacity. From the buying firm’s perspective,
both firms are induced to reserve H units of capacity
to cover its demand in all scenarios. While it seems
intuitive to declare this to be the best scenario for the
supplier, we now show that there is a capacity sharing
arrangement under which the supplier can charge a
higher price for capacity while both buyers also
increase their profits by avoiding over-reservation.
In this section, we propose the use of capacity reserva-
tion with transfer price between two buying firms in
order to improve supply chain efficiency. The underly-
ing idea is that a buying firm charges the other firm a
fee when it uses the leftover capacity. Specifically, if
firm i reserves the capacity and the leftovers get used
by firm j, then firm j directly pays firm i at a price of ti
per unit of the used capacity. This transfer price pay-
ment is essentially a form of tradable capacity option,
which is used in practice. For instance, TSMC pioneered
selling tradable capacity options (Economist 1996, LaPe-
dus 1995, Plambeck and Taylor 2007). The capacity
transfer price also runs along the same lines as the
transfer payment contract in Roels and Tang (2017).
In what follows, we consider the capacity reservation
with transfer price (named as “transferrable capacity”
for brevity).4 We use t to refer to this capacity type, ct to
denote the price of reserving one unit of transferable
capacity, and ti to denote the capacity transfer prices
from firm j to firm i (if firm i chooses transferrable
capacity.) Then we have firm i’s expected profit for
given capacity-type choices (s1, s2) where si 2 {e, t} as
follows.





























We note that the transfer price ti should not be
greater than the unit profit margin, that is, ti ≤ p  w.
Otherwise, firms will simply not transfer any capacity
and the firms’ decisions degenerate to exclusive
capacity. We therefore simplify the transfer price
decision by defining t̂i , tipw. Hence, deciding a trans-
fer price ti is equivalent to deciding t̂i 2 ½0; 1. There-
fore, the expected profit for firm i for a given pair of














Comparing Equations (8) to (1), we observe that the
impact of the transfer price is twofold. On the
demand side, we observe that the effective demand
increases from Di to Di þ t̂i min ðDj  kjÞþ;

ðki  DiÞþg under transferrable capacity. Intuitively,
for a unit of firm j’s demand satisfied by firm i’s
reserved capacity, firm i is able to accrue a unit profit
of ti, which is equivalent to firm i’s own demand
increases by t̂i unit. On the capacity side, compared to
the first-priority capacity case, the effective capacity to
firm i shrinks from ki þ kj  Dj
 þ
to
ki þ 1  t̂j
 
min ðDi  kiÞþ;
 ðkj  DjÞþg. This occurs
because, if firm i accesses the reserved capacity by
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firm j, it will incur an additional cost of tj compared to
the first-priority capacity case. This additional cost is
reflected by the shrinking effective capacity observed
above. Compared to the exclusive capacity case,
however, the available capacity to firm i increases
from ki to ki þ 1  t̂j
 
min ðDi  kiÞþ; ðkj  DjÞþ
 
.
This observation is intuitive as firm i is able to access
firm j’s leftover capacity, albeit at a higher cost.
When both firms choose transferrable capacity, we
focus on the symmetric scenario where the capacity
transfer prices are the same, that is, t̂1 ¼ t̂2 ¼ t̂, as
the two firms are ex ante symmetric otherwise. Similar
to our previous analysis, we consider the case where
ce ≤ (p  w)a and ct  ðp  wÞa½1 þ t̂ð1  bÞ. Other-
wise, it is trivial to show that the firms will not
reserve any capacity beyond the lower bound L when
both firms choose exclusive capacity or transferrable
capacity.
As in section 3, we first study the equilibrium
reservation level for a given capacity transfer price t̂.
When there exist multiple equilibria with different
reservation levels, we choose the one that yields the
largest production (the highest utilization of the
reserved capacity). If all equilibria yield the same uti-
lization of the reserved capacity, then we select the
outcome with the fairest split of profits between the
buying firms. If all equilibria are payoff-invariant (at
the boundary of the regions defined in the proposi-
tion below), we assume the one in the proposition
below is selected without loss of generality.
PROPOSITION 7. (EQUILIBRIUM CAPACITY RESERVATION
LEVEL). Consider ce ≤ (p  w)a and ct  ðp  wÞ
a½1 þ t̂ð1  bÞ. There are three scenarios contingent on
the capacity reservation types (s1, s2) for a given capacity
transfer price t̂:
(i) Both firms reserve exclusive capacity, that is,
(s1, s2) = (e, e). The equilibrium capacity
reservation level is keei ¼ H.
(ii) Firm 1 reserves exclusive capacity while firm 2
reserves transferrable capacity, that is,
(s1, s2) = (e, t). The other case is symmetric. The
equilibrium capacity reservation level ðket1 ; ket2 Þ is as
shown in Figure 4.
(iii) Both firms reserve transferrable capacity, that is,
(s1, s2) = (t, t). The equilibrium capacity
reservation level ktti is as follows:
ktti ¼










Proposition 7 mirrors Proposition 1 in several
ways. First, as in Proposition 1(i), when both firms
reserve exclusive capacity, the only capacity level
supported is H for exactly the same reason.
Parts (ii) and (iii) describe the cases where at least
one firm chooses transferable capacity. Part (ii) of
Proposition 7 is analogous to the equilibrium reserva-
tion level in the (e, f) case (Proposition 1(ii)). As
before, the equilibrium capacity level depends on the
reservation prices and demand correlation, both of
which define the switching curves in Figure 4. Note
that the switching curve monotonically changes in
demand correlation.
Comparing Propositions 1(iii) and 7(iii), we
observe that the capacity reservation level in the (t, t)
case is higher than that in the (f, f) case for the same
reservation price, ct = cf. To see why, first note that
the firm does not gain any profit from lending its left-
overs to the other firm under first-priority capacity.
However, in the (t, t) case, the same action brings in
additional profit, as the other firm pays to access the
leftover capacity, which reduces the obsolescence cost
of the reserved capacity. Hence, the firms reserve
more under (t, t). We note that if t̂ ¼ 0, the capacity
reservation level degenerates to that under first-prior-
ity capacity. As in Proposition 1, the capacity level
depends on demand correlation. As the correlation
increases, the firm is less likely to access the other
firm’s leftover capacity, and thus needs to reserve
more capacity.
We next analyze the buyers’ equilibrium capacity
type choices in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 8. (EQUILIBRIUM CAPACITY TYPE CHOICES). For
a given capacity transfer price t̂, transferrable capacity
reservation price ct, and proxy demand correlation b, there
exist two thresholds ~ceðct; b; t̂Þ and ĉeðct; b; t̂Þ such that,
in equilibrium,
(i) when ce  ~ceðct; b; t̂Þ, both firms reserve exclusive
capacity;
(ii) when ~ceðct; b; t̂Þ\ ce  ĉeðct; b; t̂Þ, one firm
reserves exclusive capacity and the other firm
reserves transferrable capacity;
Figure 4 Equilibrium Capacity Reservation Level ðk et1 ; k et2 Þ
Note. The figure shows the case when t̂  að1bÞ1 ab . When t̂ [ að1bÞ1 ab , the
outcome is similar with the upper left region (0, 2H) replaced by (L,
2HL).
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(iii) when ĉeðct; b; t̂Þ\ ce, both firms reserve
transferrable capacity.
When exclusive capacity is much cheaper than
transferrable capacity (case i), it is expected that both
firms reserve exclusive capacity. On the other hand,
when transferrable capacity is much cheaper (case iii),
it is also expected that both firms reserve transferrable
capacity. In the middle range (~ceðct; b; t̂Þ\ ce 
ĉeðct; b; t̂Þ), however, one firm chooses transferrable
capacity even if it might be slightly more expensive
because it may earn a positive profit from the
reserved capacity utilized by the other firm, while the
other chooses exclusive capacity, incentivizes the for-
mer firm to build a larger amount of transferrable
capacity, and utilizes the leftover capacity if any.
We next characterize the supplier’s equilibrium
capacity reservation prices, building on the subgame
perfect equilibrium capacity-type choices and reser-
vation levels.
PROPOSITION 9. (EQUILIBRIUM CAPACITY RESERVATION
PRICES). There exists a threshold t such that
(i) if t̂  t, the supplier sets capacity reservation prices
ðce ; ct Þ such that ce ¼ ðp  wÞa and
ce  ~ceðct ; b; t̂Þ. Both firms choose exclusive
capacity in equilibrium.
(ii) if t̂ [ t, the supplier sets capacity reservation prices
ðce ; ct Þ such that ct ¼ ðp  wÞa½1 þ t̂ð1  bÞ
and ce  ĉeðct ; b; t̂Þ. Both firms choose
transferrable capacity in equilibrium.
Note that the optimal capacity price and equilib-
rium region depend on the unit-price of traded capac-
ity (̂t) and demand correlation, which defines the two
thresholds—~ceðct ; b; t̂Þ and ĉeðct ; b; t̂). We note that
when the capacity transfer price t̂ is large enough, the
supplier may prefer to set the capacity reservation
prices such that both firms choose transferrable capac-
ity in equilibrium. This capacity reservation price
decision is in sharp contrast with the results in Propo-
sition 5, where the supplier always induces buying
firms to choose exclusive capacity. To understand
why the supplier prefers to induce transferrable
capacity, we note that although the total reserved
capacity (H + L) is lower than the one where both
firms choose exclusive capacity (2H), the supplier is
able to charge a much higher capacity reservation
price ðp  wÞa½1 þ t̂ð1  bÞ. This observation fol-
lows that the firms have a higher valuation about
transferrable capacity because of the opportunity to
earn profit from the capacity transfer price on any idle
capacity. Therefore, the supplier’s profit is higher
when both firms choose transferrable capacity.
We have shown that the supplier may benefit from
transferrable capacity. We show in the next
proposition that the buyers can also benefit from trad-
ing the reserved capacity with each other. This propo-
sition sheds lights on a range of transfer prices that
should be used to induce a win–win–win outcome:
the outcome that is desired by all parties.
PROPOSITION 10. (PARETO-IMPROVEMENT REGION OF
CAPACITY TRANSFER PRICE t̂). When the proxy demand
correlation b  cpa, there exist two thresholds t and t such
that if t̂ 2 ½t; t, the equilibrium outcome is a win–win–
win situation for both firms and the supplier (compared
to the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 5). The supply
chain efficiency improvement D% is
D% ¼ ðH  LÞðc pabÞ
pð2 2aþ abÞLþ pað2 bÞH  cðH þ LÞ :
From the firms’ perspective, when the correlation
between the two firms is not large, the value of trans-
ferrable capacity is high because of the high chance of
earning extra profit from the transferred capacity
when the reserved capacity is not utilized by the firm.
Therefore, although the capacity reservation level for
one firm is smaller (HþL2 \H) while the capacity reser-
vation price is higher (ðp  wÞa½1 þ t̂ð1  bÞ [
ðp  wÞa), the firm still benefits from choosing trans-
ferrable capacity. In the win–win–win situation, we
note that the supply chain efficiency is improved
although the capacity reservation level is reduced,
because the flexibility in utilizing the reserved capac-
ity allows the supply chain to save some capacity
installation cost with less reserved capacity.
6. Robustness Check and Numerical
Analysis
So far we have utilized a symmetric two-point distri-
bution of demand to derive theoretical results and
generate managerial insights for analytical tractabil-
ity. In this section, we perform the robustness checks
with the random demands of firms i and j, (Di, Dj),
following a bivariate normal distribution. The mar-
ginal distribution of Di is normal with mean li and
standard deviation ri, and the correlation between the
two demands is q. We note that the game among the
three parties is complicated: the two buyers decide
both capacity reservation types and levels while the
supplier decides the capacity reservation prices. The
interaction among the three decisions makes the theo-
retical analysis intractable under a bivariate normal
distribution. Therefore, we numerically derive the
equilibrium using bivariate normal demand distribu-
tion, and illustrate the robustness of the managerial
insights obtained with the two-point distributions
while exploring the impact of other factors. We then
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utilize the numerical testing beds to explore the effi-
ciency implications of the capacity reservation con-
tracts.
We use the following default parameters (if not
changed as a variable in the analysis): the market
price p = 15, the wholesale price w = 5, the capacity
installation cost c = 7, the marginal distribution for
demand i is normal with mean l1 = l2 = 10 and stan-
dard deviation r1 = r2 = 1, and the demand correla-
tion q = 0.
In what follows, we first illustrate the comparison
among the firms’ equilibrium capacities. Then we
show the impact of demand correlation, illustrate the
impact of capacity transfer price on the equilibrium
outcome, and show the Pareto-improvement region.
After that, we illustrate the impact of demand asym-
metry on the equilibrium capacity reservation levels
and profits. We finally analyze the efficiency loss in
the supply chain associated with capacity reservation.
In addition, we have conducted the analysis regard-
ing the equilibrium capacity reservation levels in the
presence of three buying firms in Appendix C.
Comparison of equilibrium capacity. The compar-
ison of the equilibrium capacity is provided in Fig-
ure 5. We first notice that the equilibrium exclusive
capacity kee is greater than the equilibrium first-prior-
ity capacity kff. We then observe that as the capacity
transfer price t̂ increases, the equilibrium trans-
ferrable capacity also increases. When the transfer
price t̂ is small (̂t ¼ 0:1), the equilibrium transferrable
capacity ktt is close to the equilibrium first-priority
capacity kff. On the other hand, when the transfer
price t̂ is sufficiently large (̂t ¼ 0:9), the equilibrium
transferrable capacity ktt is greater than the equilib-
rium exclusive capacity kee. These observations are
consistent with the comparison between the equilib-
rium capacities in Propositions 1 and 7.
Impact of demand correlation. Similar to the result
in Proposition 4, we observe that when the capacity
reservation price is small for first-priority capacity
(cf = 3), as demand correlation increases, the free-
rider region shrinks as shown in Figure 6a. The free-
rider region shrinks because when first-priority
capacity is relatively inexpensive, the benefit from
choosing the more expensive exclusive capacity and
forcing the other firm to build larger first-priority
capacity decreases faster than the profit when both
firms choose first-priority capacity, as the demand
correlation increases.
However, when the capacity reservation price is
high for first-priority capacity (cf = 6), as demand cor-
relation increases, the free-rider region first expands
and then shrinks as shown in Figure 6b. This occurs
because when first-priority capacity is expensive and
the demand is significantly negatively correlated, the
pooling benefit when both firms choose first-priority
capacity significantly decreases, as the demand corre-
lation increases. When the demand is more positively
correlated, the impact is reversed and the intuition is
similar to the case above.
Impact of capacity transfer price. We illustrate the
Pareto-improvement region with respect to the capac-
ity transfer price t̂ in Figure 7. When the capacity
choices are between exclusive and first-priority capac-
ities, both firms choosing exclusive capacity is the
equilibrium, resulting in the profits of pees and p
ee
i in
the figures. When the capacity choices are between
exclusive and transferrable capacities, we observe that
when t̂ is between 0.05 and 0.49, both firms’ and sup-
plier’s profits are higher than the ones in the previous
case. Therefore, when the capacity transfer price t̂ is
in the Pareto-improvement region (indicated by the
gray area), all three stakeholders (one supplier and
two buying firms) obtain a higher profit, resulting in a
higher supply chain efficiency.
Impact of demand asymmetry. To explore the
impact of demand asymmetry between the two buy-
ing firms, we consider two scenarios. In the first sce-
nario, we fix the demand of firm 1 and change the
mean of firm 2’s demand. In the second scenario, we
fix the demand of firm 1 and change the standard devi-
ation of firm 2’s demand. Under both scenarios, we
numerically compute the supplier’s equilibrium
capacity reservation price, the buying firms’ equilib-
rium capacity type and reservation level choices, as
well as the equilibrium profit for both firms and the
supplier. The outcomes of the two scenarios are
reported in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. We note that
the parameters of Setting D in Table 1 and the








Figure 5 Comparison of Equilibrium Capacities: kee, kff, and ktt, When
Capacity Reservation Price ce = cf = ct
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parameters of Setting K in Table 2 are the same, and
therefore the equilibrium outcomes are the same. For
continuity of the comparison we list both scenarios in
their respective tables.
We first observe from Tables 1 and 2 that under all
settings, when the capacity type choices are between
exclusive and first-priority capacity, both buying
firms choose the exclusive capacity in equilibrium;
when the capacity type choices are between exclusive
and transferrable capacity, both firms choose the
transferrable capacity in equilibrium; the equilibrium
in the latter case results in Pareto-improvement for
profits of both firms and the supplier. Thus, the
insight that the transferrable capacity could result in
Pareto-improvement for all three parties is still
robust.
We next explain the difference on the impact of the
difference in the means of demands (Table 1) and the
difference in the standard deviations of demands
(Table 2). As the mean of firm 2’s demand increases
from 7 to 13 (while fixing the mean of firm 1’s
demand at 10), the supplier charges higher capacity
reservation prices to explore the higher demands of
the firms. As a result, firm 1, whose demand remains
the same, suffers from the higher capacity reservation
prices, and reduces the capacity reservation quanti-
ties. Therefore, firm 1’s profit decreases in the mean of
firm 2’s demand. On the other hand, the increased
mean demand faced by firm 2 corrects the negative
incentive to reserve capacity due to the higher capac-
ity reservation prices. Therefore, firm 2 reserves a
higher capacity level and the profit of firm 2 increases,
as the mean of firm 2’s demand increases. The sup-
plier benefits from a larger demand of the buying
firms, and therefore, the supplier’s profit also increases
in the mean of firm 2’s demand.
As the standard deviation of firm 2’s demand
increases from 0.7 to 1.3 (while fixing the standard
deviation of firm 1’s demand at 1), the supplier
reduces the capacity reservation prices. As a result,
firm 1 benefits from the reduced capacity reservation
prices and increases the capacity reservation quanti-
ties. Thus, firm 1’s profit increases in the standard
deviation of firm 2’s demand. On the other hand, firm
2 reduces the capacity reservation quantities due to
the increased standard deviation of its demand. How-
ever, firm 2 also significantly benefits from the lower
capacity reservation prices charged by the supplier,
and therefore, firm 2’s profit also increases in its
demand standard deviation. The supplier is hurt by
the demand with a higher standard deviation of
demands. Thus, the supplier’s profit decreases in the
standard deviation of firm 2’s demand.
Efficiency loss with capacity reservation. In a cen-
tralized supply chain, both the buyers and the sup-
plier integrate as one firm c (abbreviated for
“centralized”). Therefore, the firm c’s profit pc(kc) is as
follows:
pcðkcÞ ¼ pE min D1 þD2; kcf g½   ckc: ð9Þ
Firm c should install the capacity reservation level
to maximize the profit pc(kc). Comparing to the case
of transferrable capacity, the integrated firm does














Figure 6 Impact of Demand Correlation on Equilibrium Capacity Type Choices ðk s1s21 ; k s1s22 Þ
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not suffer from the double marginalization while
maintaining the flexibility to satisfy either buyer’s
demand. Therefore, one may expect that the central-
ized capacity reservation level is higher than the one
under transferrable capacity. On the other hand,
comparing to exclusive capacity, while the inte-
grated firm does not suffer from double marginal-
ization (which should lead to a higher capacity
level), it is also more flexible to utilize the installed
capacity (which should lead to a lower capacity
level due to demand pooling). Whether the total
centralized capacity is higher or lower than the one
under exclusive capacity depends on which effect is
stronger. In Figure 8, we observe that the absence of
double marginalization has a strong impact on the
capacity decision and therefore the centralized
capacity is much higher than in other cases. In addi-
tion, the higher the capacity transfer price is, the
higher the total capacity is induced as both firms are
willing to reserve more capacity.
We then compare the supply chain efficiency to the
centralized benchmark in Figure 9. When trans-
ferrable capacity is not available, the supplier induces
both firms to choose exclusive capacity; when trans-
ferrable capacity is available, the supplier induces
both firms to choose transferrable capacity. We
observe that the efficiency is improved under trans-
ferrable capacity than under exclusive capacity when
we compare the case of si = t to that of si = e. In addi-
tion, we observe that for given capacity installation
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 7 Pareto-Improvement Region (gray area) with Respect to Capacity Transfer Price t̂
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cost c, the efficiency loss decreases as the capacity
transfer price t̂ increases, which is consistent with the
observation on the equilibrium capacity—the higher
the capacity transfer price, the closer the equilibrium
capacity is to the centralized capacity. These observa-
tions attest to the benefit of transferrable capacity to
improve the supply chain efficiency over exclusive
capacity.
7. Concluding Remarks
We analyze a capacity reservation problem when
multiple firms order from a common supplier. When
the firms choose between exclusive and first-priority
reservations, we identify three equilibria, and show
that two factors—capacity reservation prices and
demand correlation—critically affect which equilib-
rium (and what capacity reservation level) arises. As
the cost of reserving capacity exclusively increases,
the equilibrium shifts from both firms choosing exclu-
sive capacity, to one firm choosing exclusive capacity
and the other firm choosing first-priority capacity, to
both firms choosing first-priority capacity. As
demand correlation decreases, contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom that the firms should be more likely to
choose first-priority capacity for resource pooling
(which is more beneficial when the demand correla-
tion is low or negative), we find that firms are less
likely to reserve first-priority capacity—that is, the
region in which at least one firm prefers to reserve
capacity exclusively increases.
We identify two cases where the equilibrium reser-
vation can be inefficient for the buying firms. When
the price of exclusive capacity is slightly higher than
Table 2 Impact of Asymmetric Standard Deviation of Demands
(e, f ) (e, t)
Setting (r1, r2) ðs1; s2Þ ce ðk ee1 ; k ee2 Þ ðPee1 ; Pee2 ; Pees Þ ðs1; s2Þ ct ðk tt1 ; k tt2 Þ ðPtt1 ; Ptt2 ; Ptts Þ
H (1, 0.7) (e, e) 9.66 (8.17, 8.72) (2.64, 2.87, 129.32) (t, t) 9.67 (8.28, 8.78) (2.67, 2.91, 130.86)
I (1, 0.8) (e, e) 9.63 (8.21, 8.57) (2.85, 3.01, 127.93) (t, t) 9.65 (8.31, 8.64) (2.89, 3.06, 129.58)
J (1, 0.9) (e, e) 9.61 (8.24, 8.41) (3.06, 3.15, 126.57) (t, t) 9.62 (8.34, 8.50) (3.11, 3.20, 128.31)
K (1, 1) (e, e) 9.58 (8.27, 8.27) (3.28, 3.28, 125.23) (t, t) 9.60 (8.36, 8.36) (3.33, 3.33, 127.06)
L (1, 1.1) (e, e) 9.56 (8.30, 8.13) (3.50, 3.41, 123.93) (t, t) 9.57 (8.39, 8.23) (3.56, 3.46, 125.82)
M (1, 1.2) (e, e) 9.53 (8.33, 7.99) (3.73, 3.53, 122.64) (t, t) 9.55 (8.41, 8.10) (3.79, 3.58, 124.60)
N (1, 1.3) (e, e) 9.50 (8.35, 7.86) (3.96, 3.65, 121.39) (t, t) 9.52 (8.43, 7.98) (4.02, 3.70, 123.39)
Note: (e, f ) indicates the capacity type choices are the exclusive capacity and the first-priority capacity; (e, t) indicates the capacity type choices are the
exclusive capacity and the transferrable capacity.





Figure 8 Equilibrium Capacity Comparison
Table 1 Impact of Asymmetric Mean of Demands
(e, f ) (e, t)
Setting (l1, l2) ðs1; s2Þ ce ðk ee1 ; kee2 Þ ðPee1 ; Pee2 ; Pees Þ ðs1; s2Þ ct ðk tt1 ; k tt2 Þ ðPtt1 ; Ptt2 ; Ptts Þ
A (10, 7) (e, e) 9.49 (8.37, 5.37) (4.08, 2.54, 102.62) (t, t) 9.51 (8.45, 5.45) (4.10, 2.63, 104.39)
B (10, 8) (e, e) 9.52 (8.33, 6.33) (3.78, 2.82, 110.13) (t, t) 9.54 (8.42, 6.42) (3.81, 2.90, 111.91)
C (10, 9) (e, e) 9.55 (8.30, 7.30) (3.51, 3.07, 117.66) (t, t) 9.57 (8.39, 7.39) (3.56, 3.13, 119.47)
D (10, 10) (e, e) 9.58 (8.27, 8.27) (3.28, 3.28, 125.23) (t, t) 9.60 (8.36, 8.36) (3.33, 3.33, 127.06)
E (10, 11) (e, e) 9.61 (8.24, 9.24) (3.07, 3.47, 132.83) (t, t) 9.62 (8.34, 9.34) (3.13, 3.51, 134.67)
F (10, 12) (e, e) 9.63 (8.21, 10.21) (2.89, 3.63, 140.45) (t, t) 9.64 (8.31, 10.31) (2.95, 3.67, 142.30)
G (10, 13) (e, e) 9.65 (8.19, 11.19) (2.72, 3.77, 148.09) (t, t) 9.66 (8.29, 11.29) (2.79, 3.81, 149.95)
Note: (e, f ) indicates the capacity type choices are the exclusive capacity and the first-priority capacity; (e, t) indicates the capacity type choices are the
exclusive capacity and the transferrable capacity.
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the price of first-priority capacity, a free-rider equilib-
rium arises in which one firm reserves large first-
priority capacity and the other firm reserves small
exclusive capacity. In this scenario, the firm reserving
exclusive capacity would have been better off if it had
reserved the same amount of first-priority capacity.
However, the firm needs to reserve the more expen-
sive exclusive capacity in order to induce the other
firm to reserve a large amount of first-priority capac-
ity. On the other hand, if the price of exclusive capac-
ity is the same as first-priority capacity, firms may
reserve a large exclusive capacity instead of pooling
the capacity by choosing first-priority reservation,
resulting in a prisoner’s dilemma. In this case, the firms
would have been better off if both firms had reserved
less capacity under first-priority reservation and
shared their leftovers. Therefore, demanding the
exclusive right to use the capacity does not necessar-
ily serve the buying firm’s best interests. Once again,
demand correlation plays a critical role: The adverse
outcomes vanish as the demand correlation increases.
When the supplier strategically sets the capacity
reservation prices, it induced the firms to reserve a
large amount of exclusive capacity, resulting in both
firms being trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Although this seems to be the best scenario for the
supplier, we find that an even better arrangement is
possible which benefits all three parties of the supply
chain—the supplier and both buyers, if the buyers are
allowed to trade their leftover capacity with each
other at a capacity transfer price. This transferrable
capacity arrangement, which is a modified first-prior-
ity capacity with a capacity transfer price, allows the
firms to possibly earn profits from their leftover
capacity and thus results in a higher valuation of the
reserved capacity. On the other hand, the supplier is
able to charge a higher capacity reservation price
because of the firms’ higher valuations for capacity.
When the demand correlation is low enough, the
capacity transfer price may lead to a win–win–win
equilibrium outcome to both the supplier and the
buying firms.
Our study suggests several future research oppor-
tunities. At a more general level, given the increasing
trend of decentralized supply networks, one poten-
tial opportunity is to consider a multi-tier supply
chain in which the lower-tier buying firms may also
reserve capacity or conduct other supplier develop-
ment activities at upper-tier sub-suppliers who
supply to the immediate suppliers of these buying
firms. Also, under such multi-tier supply chain
structure, what might happen if the buying firms
acquire a supplier or a sub-supplier? How will
information asymmetry regarding the supplier’s cost
or the buyer’s demand affect the decisions in such a
supply network? We believe that such scenarios
will provide several fruitful research opportunities
in this area.
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Notes
1Cosmax is a leading ODM (Original Design Manufac-
turer) of beauty and cosmetic products based in South
Korea.
2Another reason why the exclusive reservation is more
costly than first-priority reservation from the buying
firms’ perspective is that implementing exclusive capacity
often requires effort on the part of the buying firms and
the implementation cost can be proportionate to the
reserved capacity, e.g., installing monitoring devices such
as counters on each reserved machine. In our study, we
focus on the fact that the supplier may have incentive to
offer a discount, since the implementation cost associated
with the exclusive capacity (such as the cost to install
counters on each machine) is relatively small compared to
the capacity reservation cost.
3A random variable X is larger than a random variable Y
in the usual stochastic sense, that is, X ≥ stY, if
P(X ≤ x) ≤ P(Y ≤ x) for any given x 2 (∞, ∞).







Figure 9 Supply Chain Efficiency Loss
Note. The curve si = e compares the scenario where both firms are
induced to choose exclusive capacity (Proposition 5) to the centralized
benchmark (the difference between the two profits divided by the profit in
the centralized benchmark). The curves si = t compare the scenario where
both firms are induced to choose transferrable capacity with the capacity
transfer price t̂ to the centralized benchmark.
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4We note first-priority capacity is a special case of trans-
ferrable capacity when the transfer price is 0.
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